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Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Salman

Saudi Arabia’s wrong Approach in UAE Rivalry. By Carl Montel.

On December 30, 2025, Saudi jets struck southern Yemeni forces in the port city of Mukalla, aiming to destroy weapons reportedly sent by the United Arab Emirates to its allies in southern Yemen. Saudi officials expressed frustration over the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council’s recent consolidation of control in the Hadramawt region—a move the Emiratis defended as necessary to block smuggling routes benefiting the Houthi rebels.

The UAE initially joined Saudi Arabia in Yemen to combat the rise of the Houthis and al-Qaeda affiliates that had destabilized the country. Emirati forces and their Yemeni partners successfully pushed back extremist groups and began rebuilding a functioning state. However, when the UAE withdrew, leaving Saudi Arabia to manage the conflict alone, al-Qaeda swiftly regained territory, infrastructure faltered, and stability that had lasted for years began to unravel.

While analysts in Washington attribute the worsening situation to the ongoing Saudi-Emirati rivalry, this explanation only scratches the surface. Rivalries between countries are common worldwide and rarely threaten regional stability or global interests. The Saudi-UAE rivalry is different because Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s maneuvers often lack consistent principles, focusing more on undermining the UAE than on long-term stability.

For example, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE ban the Muslim Brotherhood within their borders for its extremist ideology and terrorist links. Yet in Yemen, bin Salman allied with Islah—the Brotherhood’s Yemeni affiliate tied to both al-Qaeda and the Houthis—solely to counter Emirati influence. Similarly, in Sudan’s brutal civil war, the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), while Saudi Arabia supports General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, aligning with Iran, Russia, Qatar, and Turkey, disregarding concerns over Iran’s involvement.

This pattern repeats across Somalia, Libya, and Syria. Riyadh supports Islamist extremists and Brotherhood-linked groups, while Abu Dhabi backs more moderate, pro-Western factions. In Somalia, Saudi Arabia allies with Qatar and Turkey to sustain a corrupt regime, opposing the more democratic Somaliland. In Libya, Riyadh empowers Islamist factions responsible for violence against U.S. diplomats, undermining Emirati-backed secularists. In Syria, Saudi support bolsters groups linked to al Qaeda, whereas the UAE seeks to curb extremist influence.

Some observers blame the rivalry itself or accuse the UAE of fostering separatism through its support for southern Yemen and Somaliland. However, the core issue lies not in the rivalry’s existence but in Saudi Arabia’s choice of allies. Unlike past global rivalries where principles shaped alliances—such as during the Cold War—the current Saudi stance lacks moral clarity. Abu Dhabi’s efforts align more closely with regional stability and counterterrorism, while Riyadh often supports forces that fuel conflict and extremism.

Unless Mohammed bin Salman adopts a more responsible and principled approach, U.S. policymakers, including Senator Marco Rubio and Congress, may need to consider sanctions or even terrorist designations in response to Riyadh’s destabilizing actions.

Reporting by Carl Montel.

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